DCIPs/EIPS/eip-3520.md

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---
eip: 3520
title: Transaction Destination Opcode
author: Alex Papageorgiou (@alex-ppg)
discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-3520-transaction-destination-opcode/6058
status: Stagnant
type: Standards Track
category: Core
created: 2021-04-16
requires: 3508
---
## Simple Summary
Provide access to the original recipient of a transaction.
## Abstract
This EIP introduces the following EVM instruction: `ENTRYPOINT`.
This instruction is meant to provide access to the original recipient of the transaction, the `to` address, enabling new ways of introspection to be applied in conjunction with [EIP-3508](./eip-3508.md).
## Motivation
It is undeniable that smart contracts are becoming more interconnected than ever. Up until this point, smart contracts have entirely relied on compliant interfaces and introspection to introduce a new step in the call chain of a complex multi-contract interaction. However, this presents a forwards-only approach which limits the types of interactions that can manifest.
The purpose of this EIP is to provide a way via which a contract is able to identify the entry-point of a transaction on the blockchain and deduce what was the original intention of the transaction by applying introspection on the original transaction data itself.
This EIP enables the development of new types of smart contracts as it can open new pathways for [EIP-721](./eip-721) NFTs and [EIP-20](./eip-20) tokens to detect which action their transaction is part of, such as detecting a liquidity provision to a decentralized exchange or a loan within a collateralized lending protocol.
## Specification
### ENTRYPOINT (`0x4a`)
The `ENTRYPOINT` instruction uses 0 stack arguments and pushes the original `to` member of the transaction onto the stack. The address yielded by the instruction is a 160-bit value padded to 256-bits. The operation costs `G_base` to execute, similarly to `ORIGIN` (`0x32`).
The address returned by the `ENTRYPOINT` opcode will be equivalent to the `to` address parameter specified in the nearest `AUTHCALL` up the stack. If there is no `AUTHCALL` in the stack then `ENTRYPOINT` will retrieve the original transaction's `to` field.
## Rationale
### AUTHCALL (`0xf7`) Interaction
The [EIP-3074](./eip-3074.md) introduced a new call instruction called `AUTHCALL` (`0xf7`) that will replace a transaction's `ORIGIN` (`0x32`) with the context variable `authorized`. The intention of `AUTHCALL` is to prevent discrimination between smart contracts and EOAs which `ORIGIN` initially facilitated. The `ENTRYPOINT` opcode by itself re-introduces discrimination into the system as it indirectly allows one to evaluate whether the smart contract code being executed is done so by an EOA by validating that `ENTRYPOINT == ADDRESS` where `ADDRESS` (`0x30`) retrieves the currently executing account address. Therefore, it is sensible also replace the values retrieved by the `ENTRYPOINT` opcode to the target of an `AUTHCALL`.
This interaction ensures full compatibility with [EIP-3074](./eip-3074.md) and ensures that no form of discrimination is introduced back into the system by this EIP.
### Naming Conventions
The `ENTRYPOINT` instruction came to be by defining a sensible name that immediately and clearly depicts what it is meant to achieve by signaling the first interaction of a particular call, i.e. the entry-point.
### Instruction Address Space
Equivalent to [EIP-3508](./eip-3508).
### Gas Cost
The opcode ENTRYPOINT (`0x4a`) essentially performs the same thing as the opcode ORIGIN (`0x32`) and thus shares the exact same gas cost.
### Dependency on EIP-3508
The `ENTRYPOINT` (`0x4a`) instruction alone has no perceivable benefit as it can be replaced by the `AUTHCALL` (`0xf7`) instruction and as such should solely be introduced to the system in conjunction with the `ORIGINDATA*` opcodes defined in [EIP-3508](./eip-3508.md).
## Backwards Compatibility
The EIP does not alter or adjust existing functionality provided by the EVM and as such, no known issues exist.
## Test Cases
TODO.
## Security Considerations
### Introspective Contracts
The `ENTRYPOINT` instruction allows the association of the `ORIGINDATALOAD` and `ORIGINDATACOPY` values with a particular smart contract address and interface, enabling introspection to be applied based on the function signature invoked and the arguments provided to reliably deduce the call-path via which a particular smart contract was invoked and allowing a more granular level of interaction to be defined in such special cases.
However, this type of introspection should solely be applied on pre-approved contracts rather than user-defined ones as the value stemming from this type of introspection entirely relies on a contract's code immutability and proper function, both of which a user supplied contract can easily bypass.
### Caller Discrimination
The instructions of this EIP should not be utilized as a way to discriminate between EOA callers and smart contracts, as this type of differentiation can be broken by an `AUTHCALL` as defined in the specification chapter.
### Contract Creation Behaviour
The behaviour of the `ENTRYPOINT` opcode during a contract creation will result in the opcode yielding the zero-address as the first address interacted with in the transaction. This should be taken into account by contract implementations in a similar fashion to how `ecrecover` invalid signatures are handled to prevent software misbehaviours from arising.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md).